Introduction
Rationalizability and related concepts are defined and characterized in terms of sets of strategies for a player that other players think he might use. In the strategic form each player's beliefs about the play of an opponent are given by a probability measure over this set, and each such measure maps to a point in the convex hull of the set of possible strategies, as in Bernheim [3] and Pearce [9] . Consequently, we can take this convex hull as a model of what players might think about other players. In extensiveform models that use behavior strategies, the correct way to model beliefs and map them to strategies is less transparent. Geir Asheim has pointed out to us that in Dekel, Fudenberg and Levine [5] we give an incorrect definition of convex combinations of behavior strategies. As a result two of the concepts that we defined (sequential rationalizability and sequentially rationalizable self-confirming equilibrium) do not have the properties that the paper implies and intended. This erratum uses "trembles" to provide a definition of mixtures that, when embedded in our definitions of sequential rationalizability and sequentially rationalizable self-confirming equilibrium, makes them function in the way we intended. 1 In particular, with the corrected definition it will be the case that when a player thinks that only a single behavior strategy is consistent with rational play by his opponent, his beliefs about that opponent correspond to that unique behavior strategy. Consequently, sequential rationalizability implies backwards induction in finite games of perfect information with generic payoffs.
Instead of using trembles, Asheim and Perea [1] use lexicographic probability systems (extending Blume, Brandenburger and Dekel [4] ) to model players' beliefs in extensive-form games; among other things they use these systems to provide a correct definition of sequential rationalizability for two-player games. Battigalli [3] models beliefs in extensive-form games using Myerson's [8] conditional probability systems, to which lexicographic probability systems are closely related. We prefer to use trembles instead because we already used them in another part of our 1999 paper, and because for our purposes it is not necessary to track the relative likelihoods of various zeroprobability events. 
Preliminaries
To save space we will assume that the reader is familiar with most of the notation and terminology of Dekel, Fudenberg, and Levine [5] , and so we will only restate a few of the most relevant definitions. An assessment a i for player i is a probability distribution over nodes at each of his information sets. A belief for player i is a pair b i ≡ (a i , π i -i ), consisting of i's assessment over nodes a i , and i's expectations of opponents' strategies π
3 In that paper we defined belief closed as follows:
This definition is silent on what it means to say that a behavior strategy "arises from a mixture" over other behavior strategies; the paper elaborates in footnote 11, which says:
"A behavior strategy π j is generated by a mixture ( , information sets for j that are not reachable under any of the strategies in j V . 4 Such information sets are irrelevant for concepts that place no restrictions on play at 2 Contemporaneously with this paper, Asheim and Perea developed a trembles-based alternative to their use of lexicographic probability systems. 3 The assumption that player i's expectations about an opponents' play corresponds to a strategy profile incorporates the implicit restriction that opponents randomize independently. Note that what we call an "assessment" is what Kreps and Wilson [8] call a "system of beliefs for player i," and that our "belief" is similar to what they call an "assessment." 4 That is, an information set is unreachable under J Q if there is no profile J Q for j's opponents such that the information set is reached with positive probability.
information sets that the strategy precludes, but the mistake is important for concepts such as our sequential rationalizability that impose restrictions on play at all information sets.
For example consider the game in Figure 1: <put Figure 1 here>
The backwards induction profile is π 1 = (in, up) and π 2 = (across); the profile ((out, down), (down)) is an imperfect Nash equilibrium. Only up is sequentially rational at player 1's second information set, so the set of sequentially rational behavior strategies for player 1 must contain only strategies that play up at this information set. Consider the sets 6 OUT UP DOWN , 6 DOWN OUT DOWN . Since the strategy (out, down) is equivalent in the strategic form to (out, up), it "arises as a mixture over" the set of player 1's strategies in 6 . Consequently, this pair is sequentially rational and belief closed when "arises from" is defined as in footnote 11. In particular, sequential rationality and belief-closed with the original definition does not imply backwards induction.
The Extensive-Form Convex Hull
We therefore propose the following definition of the "convex hull" of behavior strategies, which corrects and builds from our previous definition by using "trembles" to make sure that every information set of player i is reachable. 5 When working with strictly positive behavior strategies, there are no unreached information sets. In this case the definition of "generated by a mixture" from our previous paper is adequate. b V b ∈ for some belief , but differs from these strategies at an information set that the strategies themselves preclude. For this reason, the changed definition of belief closed has only a minor effect on the concept of "rationalizability at reachable nodes" (definition 2.3), as this concept does not require that strategies be optimal at information sets that the strategies themselves rule out. In particular, while a given belief model V (such as the pair of singleton beliefs 1 2 , V V in the example of the last section) can be rationalizable under reachable nodes under the old definition but not under the new one (because it is not belief-closed), for any such V we can construct a V that is belief-closed by adding to each j V and every j j V π ∈ , every strategy ˆj π that agrees with j π at nodes that are reachable under j π . Every added strategy is a best response at reachable nodes to the same beliefs that rationalized the original j π , and since the set V was belief closed under the old definition, V is belief closed under the new one. 6 In particular, the change in definitions has no effect on whether a strategy profile π is a rationalizable self-confirming equilibrium, as this requires that there exist a belief model V that is rationalizable at reachable nodes, such that for all players i, every ( , )
∈ has the distribution of outcomes induced by π . Thus Theorems 2.1, 4.1, and all of the examples in Section 3 are unaffected by the change.
As we noted earlier, the change in definition does matter for the concept of sequential rationalizability, which requires that strategies in the belief model be rationalized at every information set, and it has a similar impact on the concept of a sequentially rationalizable self-confirming equilibrium. In particular, because the extensive-form convex hull of a singleton set consists solely of the single strategy in that set, the unique sequentially rationalizable profile in finite games of perfect information with generic payoffs is the one given by backwards induction. 7 Despite this change, theorem 4.2, which is the only result in [5] that refers to concepts using sequential 6 Note that when a model V that is rationalizable at reachable nodes under the old definition, the model formed by enlarging the set of strategies in each j V to its extensive-from convex hull need not be rationalizable at reachable nodes under the corrected definition. Although the new model will be beliefclosed, the strategies introduced need not be rational at reachable nodes, and indeed they may be strictly dominated. 7 Bernheim [3] defines subgame rationalizability, and argues that it yields backwards induction in generic game of perfect information. rationality, is correct as stated, since the elaborations used in the proof have a type that is indifferent between all actions at every information set.
Note finally that that even if a strategy profile π is sequentially rationalizable as a singleton set (i.e., there are beliefs i b for each player i such that the sets 1
{( , )} V b π = , etc. is sequentially rationalizable) it need not be a sequential equilibrium.
While we have assumed that each player's assessment over nodes in his information sets is consistent in the Kreps-Wilson sense of being derivable from the limit of Bayesian beliefs from full-support strategies, we have not required that all players' assessments be consistent with a single sequence of totally mixed strategy profiles, and it is known, see for instance Example 8.5 in Fudenberg and Tirole [6] , that the freedom to use different sequences to derive each player's assessment can allow additional equilibrium outcomes. (1,0) (2,0) (1,2)
